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Public enterprise inefficiency imposes great costs in terms of 
- foregone social welfare. For example, improving the real efficiency of 
the public enterprise sector by only five percent would"'': 
1) In Egypt, free resources amounting to about five percent of GDP, 
equivalent to seventy-five percent of all government direct 
taxes or enough, to triple government expenditures on education; 
2) In Pakistan, free resources amounting to one percent of GDP, 
equivalent to half of direct taxes or enough to increase 
government expenditures on education by fifty percent; and 
3) In South Korea, free resources amounting to 1.7 percent of GDP 
or over one billion dollars in 1981. 
If such gains are both significant and feasible, then how are they to be 
achieved? This paper argues that a major part of the answer lies in 
improving performance evaluation systems (Sections II and III). 
The body of the paper then specifies the elements of such a system. 
A basic indicator of efficiency is first derived (Sections V and VI) and 
then modified to account for some of the exogenous factors beyond the 
control of management (Section VII). Given a criterion (a metric) which 
is broadly applicable across enterprises, it ~ remains necessary to 
establish criterion—values (standards) which demarcate "good" from "bad" 
Leroy P. Jones, "Improving the Operational Efficiency of Public 
Industrial Enterprises in Egypt (Report for the U.S. Agency for 
International Development, August 1981). , Efficiency 
of Public Manufacturing Enterprises in Pakistan". (Report for 
Pakistan Ministry of Production and World Bank, February 
1981.) , Comments on Development of a Performance 
Evaluation System for the Korean Public Enterprise Sector, ("Seoul: 
Korean Development Institute, June 1980.) 
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performance and which vary according to the specific circumstances of 
individual enterprises (Sections VIII and IX). 
" The " next step is to extend the system to allow for non-commercial 
objectives and for dynamic effects (innovation and growth). The.earlier 
focus on static operational efficiency is justified by the argument that 
its Improvement takes first priority. That is, an enterprise which is 
not using its existing resources efficiently is not a likely candidate 
for new resources and is unlikely to have the ability to make a maximum 
contribution to non-commercial objectives. Nonetheless, it .remains 
v 
essential to incorporate Indicators of non-commercial and dynamic 
performance (Sections X and XI). 
Performance evaluation of public enterprises is not a sim^le matter 
and a workable system cannot be imposed arbitrarily from above 
overnight. Rather, it must be the product of an evolutionary process 
involving both enterprise managers and government supervisors. 
Accordingly, a phased system of implementation Is proposed (Section 
XIII). Finally," the feasibility of the proposed methodology is examined 
by its application to one Pakistani public enterprise (Section IV). 
II. The Importance of Performance Evaluation 
Internationally, many of the problems of the public enterprise 
sector are traceable to inadequacies in performance evaluation. This'Is 
not surprising. Public enterprise goals are difficult to specify due to 
the problems of multiple objectives (including commercial versus 
non-commercial) and plural principals (different control organs having 
different perceptions of what the goals should be). If goals cannot 
A 
be spec±f±ed9 then "good"® performance cannot be distinguished from 
"Tsad"0, managers cannot be rewarded on the basis of performance, and 
inefficiency can result» 
What if the goal area were eliminated in a soccer football league 
and no alterantive means of keeping score was subsituted? What would 
be the effect, on the quality of play? Initially; players might continue 
to exhibit their old skills through professional pride or force of 
habit. Eventually, however, new forms of behavior might be expected 
to emerge. Selfish shcrw-boating might yield rewards in crowd applause 
> 
without its old penalty- of reduced teasETOrk and scoring. Movement 
without the ball, would cease as the old costs of being out of position 
would have been. eliminated» Being out of condition T*ould incur few 
penalties and practice might become perfunctory or cancelled altogether. 
The coach would have little reason not to indulge his whims and play 
his favorites regardless of their skills. Better players would yearn 
for recognition and the satisfaction of playing to win and would move 
to other leagues and be replaced by weaker players. At best the game 
would become quite different — akin to a Sunday afternoon game of 
frisbee at the beach —~ pleasant and occasionally incorporating some 
spectacular moves, but with marginal appeal to competitive, goal-oriented 
individuals. In terms of efficiency, one can imagine the results if 
a member- of this, league were to play a competitive game with a 
conventional team» 
While the situation of public enterprises is by no means as 
bleak as this little analogy might suggest, it remains true that 
organizations without meaningful quantifiable objectives have great 
difficulties in controlling efficiency. Compare government agencies 
and private enterprises in this respect. The outputs of government 
departments are generally difficult or Impossible to quantify: how do 
you measure the performance of the Ministries of Finance or Defense? 
For private enterprises, on the other hand, long-term profits and growth 
provide quite reasonable first approximations to performance. "Hie 
relative difficulty with which performance can be measured is one major 
piece of the explanation of the widespread view .of governments as 
inefficient-
Public enterprise is a hybrid, sharing characteristics of public 
•f 
governmental institutions and private enterprise. Like government, some 
of its goals (non-commerical, far short) are difficult to quantify; like 
a private enterprise, some of its. objectives 'commercial, for short) 
are readily qauntifiable. If "poor" commercial performance can be 
readily explained away in terms of "non-ccrmmercial" objectives and if 
no effort is made to distinguish between legitimate reasons for poor 
commercial performance (e.g., government pricing policies) and 
illegitimate reasons (e.g., incompetence leading to high costs), then 
even the quantifiable objectives lose their power for guidance, motivation 
evaluation and control. The enterprise then in effect becomes just 
like a government agency rather than a hybrid. The public enterprise 
manager plays a game without a score. 
For some public enterprises this is perhaps inevitable. In a 
regional development bank the non-commercial objectives may so outweigh 
the commercial ones that quantification is not feasible. For most 
public enterprises, however, the bulk of their services to society come 
through their commercial activities and systematic performance 
evaluation becomes feasible. 
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Xn short, most public enterprises are in fact evaluated like a 
public institution "(which is to say, not at all) and if they are to 
be made more efficient, they must be made more like private enterprises^ 
with quantified performance indicators to serve as a first approximation 
to performance. This is not to say that they are to be evaluated like a 
private enterprise, but rather that, like a private enterprise, they 
must be evaluated» 
III. Autonomy and Decentralization 
Performance evaluation is critical in Its own right, but 
its importance is compounded because it Is a precondition to reform of 
the autonomy structure» Many of the better public enterprise managers 
in Pakistan, asked how to improve the system, respond: "Give us clear 
objectives,, then give us the autonomy to pursue those objectives, and 
judge, us by the results»" They are right in linking the signaling 
system to autonomy, because without clear obj ectives and an Incentive 
system, autonomy cannot be delegated. 
To illustrate,, consider the determination of the level of working 
capital, a decision which many Pakistani managers point to as being 
among their most difficult since they believe they have insufficient 
autonomy. In- a private enterprise the power to set the level of 
working capital is almost invariably delegated to the chief executive 
officer by the shareholders and the Board of Directors. The .assumption 
is that the manager will keep as much working capital as necessary for 
efficient operation, but. no more, since the funds could otherwise be 
used to, generate income directly (in economists' jargon, he will acquire 
working capital only up to the point where its marginal cost equals Its 
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marginal revenue product). The reason that this is a safe assumption 
is that the manager is judged and rewarded on the basis of profit, which 
will rise or fall (in part) according to the correctness of decisions 
on the level of working capital. The board can therefore exercise its 
control function by examining outcomes (profit) rather than the process 
by which the outcome is. generated.. If, on the other hand, the manager 
has little or no reason to be concerned with raising the profit of the 
firm, then he might not be expected to make the correct decision on the 
level of. working capital. He might divert funds from more productive 
uses by keeping levels of inventory and cash far beyond the level 
necessitated by prudent management so as to reduce risk and avoid any 
possible difficult decision — it is after all easier to keep all your 
funds in a checking deposit account than to constantly shuttle them 
between short and long-term interest-bearing deposits. Or, he might 
wish to use the working capital to absorb possible losses and hence 
disguise inefficiency and keep the enterprise from being shut down. 
In such situations, the shareholder cannot wholly delegate the working 
capital decision.. 
In the case of public enterprise in Pakistan, there are two reasons 
for government involvment in the working capital decision. The first 
is macroeconomic control of the aggregate level of credit. This, however, 
could be accomplished by setting an overall credit ceiling to be 
allocated by price rationing. This effective delegation would fail, 
.however, if it were feared that managers would take "tod much" 
regardless of the price. As a result of this second reason, various 
representatives of the government — often high level — find themselves 
involved in trying to Cake detailed—decisions as to just what constitutes 
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legitimate working capital levels for individual firms» The difficulties 
are that, the process is time consuming,, that the ministries often lack 
the information and the business expertise to know just what levels, are 
"reasonable'0 and that scarce ministerial talent could be better used 
elsewhere». In sua, by any standard of modern management, the working 
capital decision should be delegated to the enterprise, but given the 
inadequacies of the signaling system it often cannot be» 
The foregoing is merely one instance of a general proposition» 
When the principal cannot control. outcomes, he must control processes. 
Delegation of operational process decisions to an agent presupposes 
effective control of outcomes» This in turn requires that desirable 
outcomes be quantified and' that there is some incentive uiechanism to 
insure that the manager cares about the outcome. In sum, if more 
decisions are to be delgated to the enterprise in Pakistan, then there 
must be reform of the signaling system to insure that those decisions 
are made in the public interest» 
The link between autonomy structure and the' signaling • system is illustr; 
by Pakistani experience in the early days of the People's Party. Several 
interviewees told the following story. In 1972, it was assumed that the 
nationalized enterprises could be run by putting "good" people in charge and 
telling" thsa to m a the companies in the- national-interest... All, too often 
this resulted in excesses, with managers pursuing individual, political or 
group interests at. the expense of the nation» The Ministry and the B.I.M. 
came to recognize the problem of measuring performance and called in a 
Dutch consulting group which produced a massive report, but whose 
recommendations were eventually held to be unworkable. The natural response 
was the imposition of confining controls and more and. more decisions were 
t? 
centralized. The resulting difficulties were in part responsible for the 
current efforts at decentralization. The swing of the. autonomy pendulum 
is bound to be repeated yet again unless there is a concomitant reform 
of the signaling system. If. autonomy is to be efficiently and permanently 
delegated to the enterprise, then accountability must be insured by i 
a signaling, system which specifies and rewards socially desirable behavior. 
The Existing System ; 
Unfortunately, the existing signaling system in Pakistan is imperfect 
both in specifying and in rewarding socially desirable behavior. This sectid 
i 
merely sketches the existing system. Host commentary is incorporated into 
the subsequent normative sections. 
There is no explicit, system for guiding and evaluating the performance 
of managers though there are some explicit means of rewarding workers. The 
implicit system was revealed by asking a selection cf "-enterprise managers 
how they were judged by their superiors and by asking corporations 
and ministry officials how they judged their subordinates. Answers. 
naturally varied, but three elements dominated in that, few other criterion 
were even mentioned and in that marry respondents mentioned all three, (though 
with great divergence is. priority). These were: 
1) profit, 
2) . production, n̂rj ' 
3) avoiding labor strife. 
i 
! 
The concern-with keeping labor happy- should be viewed as,_a.„constraint impose«' 
by political considerations," rather than as an objective. The frequency 
with which it was mentioned as a factor in evaluation simply emphasizes the 
importance of the constraint» 
The striking thing' about the two true objectives on the list is their 
strictly "commercial" character. Only one interviewee even mentioned the 
possibility of there-being noncommercial objectives as well, and he was 
outside the public enterprise chain =of~ command» This is perhaps a natural 
response t@ the eseesses of th® People's. Party period in which-vague concen 
with Moing good" is said to have meant an absence of "financial discipline" 
and massive deficits. The list is then simply a reflection of the current 
Ministry policy of reversing earlier excesses so as to restore the financial 
health of the sector. 
The opposite extreme occurs in other countries where the same question 
on objectives has been met with lengthy lists (often in the form of impassioned 
speeches) of enterprise contributions to the community ranging from sponsoring 
mosques to building roads and improving worker welfare. Non-commercial 
considerations dominate. 
Forced to choose between the two extremes?, the Pakistani version can 
be viewed as healthier in the long run. However, an intermediate position —• 
recognizing some non-commercial objectives as legitimate — might be healthier 
still, and reduce the possibility of another future swing of the evaluation 
pendulum to the opposite extreme. 
There are several other shortcomings of the current list. First, 
profit, is measured in. the privately relevant rather than the publicly rele-
sense» Second,. i£ is not really possible to evaluate managers on the basi 
of profit since- is; many cases (e.g», fertilizer, cement, ghee) profit is 
overwhelmingly determined by output and input pricing decisions of the 
government; or, in the case of the vehicles sector, by foreign exchange 
allocations5 which are again outside the control of managers. Third, 
the weaknesses of profit leads to a focus on production (reflected 
in the ainrmta 1 sector- report) and this totally ignores the cost component. 
The point of these observations is not that the Pakistani system is "bad" 
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by international public enterprise-standards, only that it. can be improved 
upon*. Suggestions in. this direction will be made in subsequent sections. 
Objectives and. Performance Criterion 
A. performance criterion is simply a quantifiable, expression of 
the objectives of the enterprise.. Since public enterprise objectives 
are multiple, does it necessarily follow that multiple criteria are 
necessary? The answer is no. Multiple objectives can be routinely 
handled by aggregation if they are individually quantifiable and if 
agreement cap be reached on the relative weights to be assigned to 
each» The simplest priyate company has multiple objectives in the form 
of earning as much revenue as possible from sales of its various outputs 
while keeping down, the costs of its various intermediate and factor inputs. 
A composite performance indicator is then created by applying positive 
weights (prices) to each of the benefits (outputs) of operation and 
negative weights to each of the coats (inputs) and adding them up. 
The result is a single indicator called profit, but which is constructed 
by weighted addition, of multiple subsidiary indicators. 
• The problem, with constructing a performance criterion for public 
enterprise is not that its objectives.are multiple, but that some 
of the objectives are difficult or impossible to quantify, and that 
agreement, cannot be reached on the trade-offs (relative weights or 
prices) to be used in aggregation. In dealing with these problems it 
i3 useful to think in terms of two sets of objectives: commercial 
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and non-commercial» Commercial objectives are similar Co those of 
private firms and reflected (albeit imperfectly , as will be explained 
below) in consserical accounting procedures» Non-commercial objectives 
concert* external, effects of enterprise operations (e.g., the benefits 
of opening up a backward area, or the costs of pollution) which are not 
reflected in private accounting procedures. Non-commercial objectives 
are particularly troublesome because they are typically difficult to 
quantify (e.g., the benefits of opening up backward areas) and/or 
difficult to put weights on (the degree of pollution can be measured 
in terms of various particulate counts, but hot? can this be converted 
to dollars and cents?) 
Fortunately, for purposes of performance evaluation, the problsa 
o 
of non-commercial objectives can be substantially reduced by recognizing 
that many non~>congaereial objectives are existential rather than 
operational^, That is, they are achieved by the very existence of the 
enterprise and do not alter operational goals. They affect investment 
decisions but oat operating decisions. Project evaluation criteria 
are altered, but not performance evaluation criteria» For example, 
the decision to build an integrated steel mill might be influeased'.by 
such noncommercial objectives as the desire for national autonomy in 
a strategic material». Nonetheless, once the plant has been built, the 
non—commercial objective has been achieved (so long as steel is produced) 
and the operational objectives are only commercial — to produce as much 
steel as posaible at minimum cost. Similarly, a plane may be located 
in a backward region in part to achieve the non-commercial obj ective 
of regional equity, but once i£ is built, this objective has been 
achieved and strictly commercial considerations dominate. 
In both, of the foregoing cases, of course, the commercial success 
of the enterprises will presumably be less than for enterprises built 
without reference Co non-commercial objectives. Assuming for the moment 
that profit captures commercial objectives, this is equivalent to 
saying that it will be expected to earn a lower rate of return. 
Nonetheless, the operational - goal is to maximize that rata of return 
(or minimize the loss). The level of profit which represents "good" 
performance will be lower but profit remains the criterion. This 
raises the important methodological distinction between the general 
performance criterion and. a particular criterion value. The first 
step in performance evaluation is to select a criterion (e.g., 
profitability) which, allows, firms to be ranked on a continuum. The 
second problem is to select a criterion value (e.g., ten percent) which differ-
entiates "good" from "bad" performance. A separate section below 
will be devoted' to the problems of criterion values. Here we are still 
in the first stage search for an appropriate criterion, and the point 
is only that many non-commercial objectives are existential and can be 
ignored in constructing an operational criterion. The next section 
focuses on determining an appropriate criterion for dealing with 
commercial, objectives and. a subsequent section deals with the problem 
of adjustments for remaining operational, non-commercial objectives. 
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VI. Enterprise Performance Criterion^ Public Profit 
Assume an enterprise has no non-commercial operating objectives. 
Does it follow that standard private accounting profit; serves as a 
performance criterion? 'Hie answer is emphatically "no". Publicly 
relevant profit, is quite different from privately relevant profit 
for two sets of reasons: first, publicly•relevant accounting categories 
are- different from privately relevant categories; second, publicly 
2/ 
relevant prices differ from privately relevant prices.—' 
Accounting differences occur because private, costs are often 
public benefits and vice versa. As one example, consider corporate 
income taxes. There is a private cost and a private manager should 
— For more detailed critiques of private profit, see: Amartya Sen, 
"Profit Maximization." Text of lecture at Kerala University 
(Trivandum, March 31, 1970). 
A more detailed description of the public profit concept is found in 
Chapter III of Leroy Jones, "Performance Evaluation of Public Enterprise: 
A Methodology and an Application to Asian .Fertilizer Plants"(Boston: 
unpublished work-in-progress). 
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be rewarded for reducing raxes in favor of increasing dividends and/or 
retained earnings. For a pure public enterprise, however, taxes are 
not a cost, but merely one form in which the benefits are distributed 
to the government shareholder. A public manager should be neither 
rewarded nor penalized for reducing taxes while increasing dividends, 
retained earnings or the depreciation allowance. This is not to say that 
the distribution of the enterprise's disposable surplus is irrelevant, 
3/ 
as there are important financial and motivational implications.— 
Rather the ^oint i3 that the purpose of performance evaluation is to 
encourage the maximization of the socially relevant profit, and the 
determination of the distribution of that surplus is a separate question. 
Taxep are a privately relevant cost but not publicly relevant, public 
performance should be measured before taxes, and private performance 
after. 
As a second example of the divergence between public and private 
relevance, consider a situation in which a manager takes advantage 
of multiple interest rates to borrow from one government bank at, 
say, six percent, while depositing in another government bank at, say 
twelve percent. The shareholders of a private firm should certainly 
reward a manager for such interest arbitrage activity, but from the 
•e * 
3/ See: Malcolm:Gillis, Glenn Jenkins, and Donald Lessardy "Public 
Enterprise Finance in Developing Countries: Towards a Synthesis", 
in Public^ Enterprise-in •Developing Countries, edited by Leroy Jones 
with Richard "Mallon, Edward Mason, Paul Rosenstein-Rodan and 
Raymond Vernon. (New York: Cambridge University Press, fortheeming)^ 
Also, see: Leroy Jones, "Determinants of the Debt/Equity Ratios in 
Public Enterprises".(paper presented at United Nations Conference 
on "Investment Decision-Making in Public Enterprise", International _ 
Center for Public Enterprise in Developing Countries, Ljubljana, 
Yugoslavia, October, LSL&Q). 
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standpoint of a government shareholder;, such behavior should be neither 
4 / 
rewarded nor penalized.— This sort of arbitrage-learning constitutes 
a private benefit but a public transfer. 
These are but two of many examples of differences between publicly 
and privately relevant accounting categories. All arise because the 
private manager is charged with looking out for the interests of only 
one economic actor (the shareholder) while, the public manager should 
be concerned with the interests of all domestic actors. The performance 
indicator which reflects this broad interest will be termed "public 
profit". Brieflys it is defined as single-period variable social benefits 
less variable social costs;- that is, the difference in the value to society 
between what the enterprise takes out of the. economy (costs) and what 
it puts back, in (benefits) in any one period. More precisely, this is the 
quasi-rent generated by the fixed capital owned and operated by the 
enterprise.. Operationally, in terms of a standard profit and loss statement, 
public profit is: 
Sales 
Inventory Changes 
- Manufacturing Costs 
— Administrative and Selling Costs 
— Total Employee Costs 
-4» Depreciation and Ammortization Allowances 
- Opportunity Cost of Working Capital. 
jV Recall that the assumption is that both banks are wholly public. 
If they are foreign,, then the conclusion is reversed, and if they 
are wholly or partially held by private domestic parties, the :•. 
conclusion might be modified. 
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The second source of divergence between, public and private 
performance critérions lies in the relevant prices^ Often, an 
enterprise is forced, to sell its output in a price-controlled market 
where the price to the enterprise is less. than what society is willing 
to pay; or, it is allowed to acquire imported inputs at a preferential 
exchange rata below, thé real value of the foreign exchange to society. 
In both cases, the actual price received or paid is the relevant price 
for shareholder evaluation of private enterprise since these are the 
prices which are relevant in determining their return. From the view— 
V 
point of a government shareholder as custodian of all national resources, 
on the other hand, the relevant price is that which reflects economic 
scarcity. la principle, the solution is simples revalue the accounts 
using shadow prices, just as is common with project evaluation. in 
practice, this is unlikely to occur. Shadow prices are complex and 
controversial at best and it would take a government with great 
faitirin economists to fire a powerful retired general, politician 
or bureaucrat, based on whether the shadow multiplier for unskilled 
labor was, say, 0.1 or 0. 7. My-own judgement is that the first-best 
solution of actually making market prices reflect social scarcity is 
more likely to become reality than the second-best solution of using 
shadow prices to evaluate, performance. If neither the first nor second-
best solutions are likely to eventuate in the near future in 
Pakistan, then how can public enterprises be evaluated? 
—^For a more detailed treatment of the price problem see: Glen Jenkins 
and Mohamed Lahouel, "Evaluation of Performance of Industrial Public 
Enterprises: Criteria and Policies." (Paper presented at UNIDO Expert 
Group Meeting on the Changing Role and Function of the Public Industrial 
Sector in Development, Vienna, October 1981). 
-17-
Fortunately, there is a. practial operational way out of the dilemma. 
It will be argued in Section VII that prices are generally beyond 
management's control and in Section IX that the best available standard 
for evaluating enterprise'A® in year 't' Is provided by tlie same 
enterprise in year 't-1^ It follows that for control purposes, managers 
should be evaluated on the basis of the trend in public profit at 
constant prices. The solution to the dilemma lies in the empirical 
observation that while the levels of public profits will differ when 
evaluated at shadow as opposed to market prices, the trends will generally 
be similar. The basis for this result can be seen by considering the 
simplest possible case of an enterprise with only one output and no 
inputs. The trend in public profit would then be a quantity Index of 
output which differs by only a monotonic transformation when evaluated 
at shadow as opposed to market pricSs. In this extreme case the two 
trends are strictly identical. Introduction of multiple outputs and 
inputs eliminates this simple identity, because of the usual index 
number problsa» Nonetheless, It seems reasonable to assume, and there 
is some empirical evidence to suggest,—^ that the resulting, differences 
will generally be minor. In sum, the suggestion here is that the 
trend- of. public profit at market prices can provideg)useful and practical 
approximation to the theoretically ideal, but practically unobtainable, idea 
of the trend at shadow prices. The logic is identical to that in looking 
at the trend in real GNP per capita as a measure of the trend in 
national welfare. The approximation can be further improved if major 
/̂"""Dernes,. "Perform^aee Evaluation", Chapter Five. 
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differencea between market and shadow prices are captured through the 
introduction of a "social adjustment account", as will be explained 
in Section X below. 
VII. Management Performance Criterion , 
Many factors which determine enterprise performance are beyond 
the control of managers. The quantity of capital a manager has to work 
with and its quality (technology) and age affect relative performance, 
but were determined in previous periods, usually by someone other than 
the current manager. Prices are usually set by the government or by 
world or domestic market forces outside the control of management. 
Decisions such as hiring workers or procurement rracedures affect 
performance, but in a public enterprise may be circumscribed by government 
policy. For such reasons, a clear distinction must be made between 
enterprise performance and managerial performance. There are four 
steps in the process. 
The first step is to make a standard adjustment for two readily 
quantifiable exogenous factors — price changes and the quantity of 
capital. Simply divide public profit through by the quantity of fixed 
capital and convert to constant prices. The resulting indicator — public 
profitability at constant prices — is greatly superior to public 
profit (though still imperfect) as a measure of managerial performance 
and should be routinely computed as part of a performance evaluation 
system for all enterprises. -
For some enterprises, a second step of industry-specific quantitative 
corrections can be taken. Engineering data on the effects of scale, 
vintage and technology can sometimes be .usedto generate adjustment 
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factors for the quality of capitals Low capacity utilization due to 
shortages of inputs or inadequst®. demand can sometimes be corrected 
for by an "aa if" expansion factor. 
A third step is to recognize that often one of the best ways to 
i 
correct for a wide variety of eaterprise=spec±fie exogenous factors 
is to divide through by the achievement of the same enterprise in 
previous years» That is, by focusing on the trend in performance one 
certainly controls for- the quality of capital and to some extent for 
the nature o£ output, and input: markets». 
The fourth step is to have- a review meeting in which managers are 
allowed to "explain/1 their level of pcrf o-mance» Even after a superb 
job is- done of measuring performance, there will reaain non-quantified 
factors affecting the result» The aim. of quantification is not to replace 
the final judgement of superiors, but to aid it. The evaluation exercise 
quantifies as much as possible, and thus reduces the scope for discussion, » 
but. does not eliminate the need for individual judgements to account for 
special circumstances. 
All of these steps (except the first) can be alternatively (and 
probably better) treated by incorporation into the criterion "value 
specification, since they are necessarily industry or enterprise-specific. 
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VIII.Setting Enterprise-Specific Criterion Values 
Given the choice of any performance criterion (be.it private profit, 
public profit, labor productivity, capacity utilization, miles per gallon, 
seconds per hundred yards, or anything else) as appropriate for evaluating 
a particular endeavor, then the still more difficult task remains of 
selecting a particular criterion value. While the criterion establishes-
the scale, the criterion values establishes the point on the scale 
which distinguishes, say,, "bad" from "average" from "good" performance. 
Consider sprinters. The natural performance crtierion is¡seconds 
per hundred yards. The criterion remains valid, for men, women, children, 
senior citizens, and those in wheelchairs; what differs is the standards 
(criterion values) which distinguish meritorious performance. Similar ly 
for public enterprises. Public profitability is an appropriate 
indicator for a ghee company be it in Karachi or the Northwest Frontier 
Province, but whereas a five percent performance might be "good" in 
the region which is far from the source of imported raw materials, it 
might be "bad" in Karachi where there are negligible transport costs 
for the raw material. 
The function of the criterion value, then, is to allow for the 
plethora of enterprise-specific constraints which affect the ability 
of a particular unit to generate public profit". The number of such 
factors being large, this is no simple task. The sources of information 
which can assist in setting criterion values include: 
1) comparisons with similar firms elsewhere; 
2) comparisons with the same firm in previous years; 
3) professional judgements by third parties; 
4) professional judgemests-at the ministry level; and 
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5) professional judgements at the enterprise level. 
If there are a large number of similar units operating in similar 
circumstances, then the problem is mechanical. Simply collect data on 
relevant variables for a si efficiently large number of units, estimate 
a regression plane (preferably of the "outer-bound" form) and individual 
unit, performance is measured as a deviation from that norm (plane). 
If the number of observations is large relative to the number of 
discriminatory variables, this is a practical approach. A rowing race 
is run annually in Cambridge in which participation of different age 
groups is desired« Historical data on rowing time and age are collected, 
a regression is run, the effect of age on time, is estimated, a correction 
factor- in "seconds per year" is generated, participants aetvuJ times 
are accordingly adjusted "o yield age-corrected times and awards are 
given on this corrected time. This allows seventy-year olds to compete 
with twenty-year olds. 
The difficulty with this approach for public enterprises is that 
the number of "similar" enterprises is usually small. Pakistan has only,, 
one integrated steel mill and only two oil refineries. It has four 
public fertilizer plants but their technology is sufficiently different 
to make direct comparison difficulty Only in ghee (and to a lesser 
extent, cement) are there reasonable numbers of similar enterprises in 
Pakistan. It is no accident that the Ghee Corporation has probably 
the best cost control system in the public sector, precisely because 
of the ready availability of standards of comparison. 
The number of observations can be increased by international 
comparisons, but now the number of control variables increases geometrically 
The Pakistan Steel Corporation has a sister plant of apparently 
Identical size, and technology in Iran. Knowledge of it3 performance 
is of course useful in forming a. judgement, as to Pakistani performance, 
but there is no way to run a definitive regression. Similarly, in 
evaluating cement and fertilizer, it is essential to know that the 
international standard for operating days is 330 and that many LDCs in 
fact achieve these figures with plants similar to Pakistan. However, 
other exogenous factors (notably, the availability, quality and price 
of energy) differ, making global comparisons difficult. The point is 
that while comparisons with other domestic or foreign plants can serve 
as useful partial aids to judgement in setting criterion values, they 
are in themselves insufficient. 
How then is a "similar" enterprise to be found as a basis for 
comparison? In the entire world, the enterprise most similar to 
enterprise fAr in year Ttf is generally enterprise 'A' in year 't-1'. 
TRis leads to the use of last year'3 performance as the criterion 
value against which this year's performance is judged. The focus is 
on the trend in performance rather than the level. While this is a 
step in the right direction, it' is not a final solution, for two reasons. 
First, even for a single enterprise things change from year to year.. 
Most importantly, prices change. As already noted, this can (and should) 
be treated mechanically by shifting to constant price evaluations. 
However, other changes (e.g., in demand conditions or the availability 
of inputs) also affect performance and cannot be treated so simply. 
Moreover, a second factor needs to be- considered, namely, that the 
room for improvement varies from unit to unit. In a plant which has 
historically been, poorly ¡run, a twenty percent improvement in the 
indicator might require the same" level of managerial, effort and skill 
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as that required to produce a two percent: improvement in the indicator 
of a plant that has always been well run. 
In sum, inter-temporal and inter-enterprise comparisons are essential 
inputs into the process of setting criterion values, but in the end a 
subjective professional, judgement is required. Third-party evaluations 
can sometimes be used for this purpose. For a new firm, the project 
proposal provides some standards. It is also possible to commission 
detailed internal evaluations by consultants, but this is expensive 
and should probably be confined to weaker firms. In most cases, the 
ultimate judgement will have to be made at the corporation or ministry 
level, in consultation with the enterprise, 
IX. The Disclosure Bonus; An Aid in Setting Criterion Values 
The people with the best information as to what is feasible for a 
particular enterprise are the managers of that enterprise.. Unfortunately, 
their unbiased judgement is generally not forthcoming because it is in 
their interest to have a low target. A manager negotiating a performance 
target with the Ministry naturally stresses all the difficulties and 
tries to achieve the lowest possible target so as to increase the 
ease of its accomplishment. The resulting process of negotiation between 
enterprise and ministry, well-known in Eastern Europe, will normally 
result in a target which is below the real' potential of the enterprise. 
To induce managers to reveal their own best estimate of enterprise 
potential, a "disclosure bonus" system can be used. Briefly, the process 
is as follows: 
1) the ministry uses its judgement to set a target criterion 
value and an associated—target bonus level; 
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2) the enterprise is then free to adjust the target criterion 
value, and if It. does so, then the bonus is adjusted in the 
same direction by an amount calculated according to an 
adjustment formula; and 
3) the actual enterprise bonus may be above or below the adjusteid 
target bonu3 depending on whether actual performance is 
above or below the adjusted target, criterion value. 
The system is described in more detail in Figure One. 
The purpose of the disclosure bonus is to induce managers to: 
1) give their best estimate of enterprise potential at the 
beginning; and to 
2) proceed to do their very best during the period, regardless 
of their original estimate. 
In a- single period case with no uncertainty, this is strictly accomplished, 
as suggested, by the examples in Figure One, and proven elsewhere.—^ 
The danger of a ratchet effect remains (this year's performance alters 
next yearns proposed target/bonus relationship), but this can be reduced 
by setting targets several years in advance. This is not feasible for 
price-dependent criterion values, but may be feasible for constant-price 
criteria. Uncertainty is an unavoidable problem. The disclosure 
bonus is thus not a panacea, but does provide a useful aid in determining 
criterion values. 
V _K.L. Weitzman, "The New Soviet Incentive Model", The Bell Journal 




THE DISCLOSURE BONUS 
The Scheme 
A. Variables 
B ° Bonus 
T Target (any criterion, say profitability) 
a OverfulfIllment factor 
§5, Under fulfil Iment factor 
° Bonus adjustment factor 
G 13 Superscript indicating planning value set by government 
E 13 Superscript indicating planning value set by enterprise 
A 13 Superscript indicating value actually achieved. 
B. Process 
1. Government announcesef , subject to constraints that 
0<< 
G G 2. Government assigns preliminary B. and T . 
3. Enterprise^ chooses own T^, which automatically yields a new 
bonus according, to the formula: 
B 2 - B G (T2- T G) 
4. At the end of the period, the actual bonus is either: 
B E +.«£(TA-TE) if overfulfil Iment; or . 
B A 
B E (TA--TE) if underfulfillment. 
II. Examole 
A. Purpose: to give heuristic demonstration that under this scheme, 
it is in managers' best interests to both: 
1» tell the truth (i. e., ta reveal the T^ they think best represents 
enterprise potential)j and 
2. do their best (i.e., to maximize T̂ - regardless of what they 
predicted at the beginning of the yeaijj. 
This assîmes perfect knowledge (by managers) and no ratchet effect. 
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B. 
Figure One (cont) 
Parameters 
1„ Let < » .30 
B .60 
J » .90 
2. Assume T^ 100 (the actual technologically possible maximum) 
sa 
• At-l 80 (last year's accomplishment) 
xG 90 (government thinks enterprise can do 10 
c better than last year) B a 5 (bonus for doing 10 better). 
Alternative Enterprise Strategies and Associated Pay-Offs 
1. Do nothing (accept TG= 90 T 2 and actually produce T^ - 90) 
2. Do not negotiate but do best (accept 90 ™ T^ but produce 
TT ~ 100) 
3. Negotiate downward but overachieve (set 85, but produce 
TT 100) 
4. Brag and do best- (set x =» 110, but produce T^ - 100) 








X. Allowing for Non-Commercial Objectives; Social Adjustment Accounting 
How are operational non-commercial objectives to be dealt with? 
The central proposition Is that they must be either dealt with explicitly 
or ignored altogether. Otherwise, the entire signaling system breaks 
down, and-with it, the basis for a sensible autonomy structure. If 
a manager is allowed to get away with arguing that his poor commercial 
performance is due to pursuit of vague, unquantified non-commerical objec-
tives, then it becomes impossible to distinguish between legitimate and 
illegitimate reasons for losing money. It is then impossible to hold 
managers accountable for achievement of either commercial or non-commercial 
objectives, and therefore undesirable to delegate autonomy. 
If. this, propoaitioa is accepted,,. thea the question, is how achievement 
of nos~csTgme£eigLL. objectives is to b@ quantified and. incorporated, lata 
the perfo^aaes. evaluation system. 16. ® 8 £ he recognised thae this is 
nse a sispla. task, aed ferer eauatsiea hsve. dealt with the problem 
sasceessfttLLyo-
Osa. stsaighfe-fa-gvmgd solution, is ta eldriaate the problem by 
sifflply desyisg. validity q& nos-^cesmereial obj ectives in. public 
enterprises®- Asy wosth^Mle- nss—eo^ereial, responsibilities are. te be 
hivsdroff to sssasa.ee: pub lie. institutions,, leaving public- enterprises 
free ts operate; according- to stsictly coffiaercial principles» 
Soma observers. s±Eply dispair: of ever- imposing effective, comaereial discir-
plina oa. aa enterprise which, has recourse to* non-commercial objectives as ai 
eseass f OS* pooE* co^eseial periornaaca». This separation of- coraiercial. 
and objectives' is- nstr uncommon ia practice (e.g,, 
i£ i&- estplici£: is. contemporary Chile and Implicit, in imch^-of tins 
South. KbreEsr public, enterprise-, sector)«- More importantly, ie is also 
' ijaplicis is c a s s m t Pakistani, practice (aa explained in Section IV 
. V 
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Ignoring operational non-commercial objectives (or transferring 
them, to another agency) nay well be a superior strategy as compared to 
the cocsaon nihilistic practice of recognizing both objectives but 
holding, managers accountable for neither. It may well be a step in 
the right direction,, but a further step is possible. This involves 
quantifying the costs and/or benefits of meeting non-commercial . . 
objectives and entering them explicitly into the enterprise accounts -
a process I will call social adjustment accounting. 
One variant of social adjustment accounting is reflected in the 
French "Program Contract" system. The basic principle is that the 
enterprise should pursue only commercial objectives unless specifically 
instructed to the contrary by the government. In such a case, a 
bargain is struck as to the incremental costs incurred in meeting . 
the-stated objectives, and the enterpise is compensated in this amount. 
The obvious advantage of this system, is that it allows pursuit of 
legitimate non-commercial objectives, but controls illegitimate pursuits 
by subjecting them to an open discussion of casts (and thus of the 
trade-offs) involved. 
One technical feature of this particular variant should be noted. 
Costs are measured, rather than benefits. In. principle of course, 
the ideal solution would, be to base compensation on the benefits, allowing 
the enterprise- to earn a social profit on the difference between 
benefits and the costs, and permitting decentralized, non-bargained _ 
decision making. The problem with this is 'obviously that most non— 
commerical benefits are difficult or impossible to measure. One 
does not attempt to measure the benefits of having a military unit of a 
particular sort: rather one measures the costs and asks only whether 
the (unmeasured) benefits are greater- than the costs, not, how much greater. 
Alternativelys and more commonly, one compares the costs of 
different methods of ' achieving a particular set of benefits., 
Similarly, for the benefits of, say, keeping open a factory in a backward 
area, focusing on costs is a practical second-best alternative to measuring, 
both benefits and costs- \ 
The second variant is similar to the first in being based on a negcciai 
agreement as to the costs of meeting legitimate non-commercial objectives; 
it differs in that the compensation, is not actually paid. Instead, the 
expenditure is entered not as a.cost above the public profit Una, but as 
a transfer belcm the line. That: is, the expenditure is treated as a divider 
paid in-kind to the government.. The quantum of public profit is not affecte 
by the non-commercial activity, but some of that profit is distributed in-ki 
rather than as taxes, dividends or retained earnings-
Managers would naturally prefer the. compensated to the uncompensated, 
variant, because of the financial impact on retained earnings. Nonetheless, 
assuming the firm is financially viable, the uncompensated version is - simply 
a form of internal, cross-subsidization- which avoids the unnecessary circular 
step of. transferring funds, up to the center as taxes and dividends, only 
to be returned as subsidies. The important point is that in both variants, 
a conscious decision is made as to which non-commercial objectives are worth 
the cost and which not. 
Social adjustment accounting can also be used to deal with incorrect 
prices on major inputs and outputs. If fertilizer is sold ex-factory 
at low prices as a result of a conscious government decision to 
subsidize farmers- and/or wage-goods, then the enterprise can be compensated 
by a per unit, subsidy. Similarly, if the factory is receiving underpriced 
natural gas or electricity, then a per-unit tax can be levied to make 
the price faced by the firm approximate real economic value. This is 
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of course a cumbersome second-best alternative to simply setting the 
right price in the first place, but in some situations it may be the 
only politically or bureaucratic lly feasible way to ensure that managers 
receive correct signals as to economic scarcity. If so, then it is 
desirable that the tax/sub sidy combinations should be actually compensated, 
but they couldalao.be.uncompensated (via the below-the-lfne distribution 
method)' • if" financial viability- is not threatened*. In -.the- latter 
case the output subsidy would be credited to sales, the input debited 
vinder manufacturing costs, and the net effect entered per contra as a 
social dividend (levy)implicitly paid (received) in-kind. Public 
profit would then reflect the real economic surplus generated by the 
enterprise and managers could be regarded according to their real 
contribution to society, independently of whether or not the right orices 
were actually paid-
The ultimate variant of social adjustment accounting is to create 
an entire set of shadow accounts altering each and every accounting entry 
by a multiplier reflecting the divergence between market and economic 
prices. While such an exercise is theoretically ideal and has major 
8 / 
utility in research,— it is unlikely to->be feasible as an actual control 
device. If not, then the social adjustment account is a practical 
means of capturing the most, important benefits of the theoretical ideal. 
Remaining non-commercial benefits which.are deemed critical can be 
evaluated in qualitative terms" and entered into the system as supple-
mentary indicators. This is discussed further in Section XII. 
8/ 
— For an example, see: Leroy Jones, "Public Enterprise Performance Evaluation 
A Methodology and an Application to Asian Fertilizer Plants," (Boston: 
unpublished work-in-progress, February 1979). 
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XI. Allowing for Dynamic Effects 
A major weakness of any single-period performance indicator (be it 
private or public profit, labor or total productivity) is that it ignores 
future effects. An enterprise is a living organism and many current 
decisions fcasre costs (benefits) In the present period but .which-generate 
benefits (costs) in the future. Deferring maintenance can increase outpu 
and reduce costs this year at the expense of lower output and higher costs 
next year. Current expenditures on research, training and planning increase 
costs in the present but generate benefits in the future. Single-period 
indicators capture only one side of the benefit/cost calculations for 
decisions which impact on more than one period. Performance indicators 
which only consider current flows can thus lead managers to neglect the 
future by devoting inadequate attention'to innovation, planning, consumer 
good-will, and maintenance. 
This problem is often more acute in public enterprises. In private 
enterprise it is less likely that the future will be sacrificed to the 
present for several reasons. In an owner-operated firm the self-interest 
of the decision-maker will lead him to value the future. When ownership 
is divorced from control, long managerial tenure and deferred managerial 
compensation (stock options) can tie decision—maker interest to future 
effects. Finally, the value of shares traded on the stock market is 
heavily determined by investor perception of future effects. For public 
enterprises in LDCs, however, management is divorced from capital, tenure 
is typically brief, there is no deferred compensation, and shares are either 
not traded at all or traded in an imperfect market where government-
<¡9 
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imposed dividend policies dominate as a determinant of value. Accordingly, 
performance evaluation systems for public enterprises must explicitly incor-
porate indicators of future effects if innovation, planning, maintenance, 
9/ 
etc., are to be encouraged. 
What is needed are answers to questions such as the following: 
1) Is preventive maintenance adequate? 
2) How rapid is progress on implementation of investment projects? 
3) Does the company have a coherent ̂ up-to-date corporate plan? 
4) Is the company devoting adequate attention to research and 
development? 
5) Are- training and motivation of personnel adequate for the future 
• 
needs of the company? 
Answering such questions will necessarily be a subjective process. 
One approach is to use a five point rating scale from "inadequate" to 
"superior". Initially, most companies might be rated at the mid-point level 
of "adequate" with attention devoted to identifying a few of the best and 
worst performers. 
The set of relevant questions, and the weight attached to each, will 
vary from company to company. Many companies will have no ongoing invest-
ment projects, but for those which do, the rate of progress will be an im-
portant indicator of performance. In Pakistan, many of the innovation and 
training functions might be delegated to the Corporation level with the 
enterprises focussing on static efficiency plus such things as maintenance. 
For an example of the negative impact of single-period performance 
on evaluation, see: Joseph Berliner, The Innovation Decision in Soviet 
Industry, (Cambridge: M.I.T. Press, 1976). 
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XII. An Indicator System 
Three sorts of performance indicators are necessary 
1) Primary Indicator; (public profitability) covers static operational 
efficiency plus any non-commercial or dynamic effects which can 
'be valued in monetary terms; 
2) Supplementary Indicators: Cover dynamic effects and non-commer-
cial effects which can only be rated, but not monetized; 
3) Diagnostic Indicators: used to explain movements in the primary 
indicator (e.g., capacity utilization, inventory turnover). 
Diagnostic indicators must not be given independent weight in the 
evaluation process. Otherwise, the evils of multiple counting occur. They 
are important however, in explaining performance trends and identifying 
causal factors. Supplementary indicators, on the other hand, must be 
given independent weight. They are not duplicative of the primary 
indicator, since they cover only factors left out of the primary indicator 
because monetary quantification Is not feasible, 
XIII. Implementation of a Performance Evaluation System 
Performance evaluation is not. a simple task in private enterprises and 
it. is all the mare complicated, in public enterprises. In addition to 
appreciation of the technical analytic issues alluded to above, it requires 
a high-level political/adsiaistrative. decision that a signaling system should 
be. implemented®, a: sophisticated, information .system for monitoring • 
performance*, and a corasnnicatioa system in which the process and its results 
are discussed and modified in meetings between representatives of the 
enterprises,,. corporations and ministry. A system unilaterally and suddenly 
imposed fro® above without input, cooperation and appreciation of the operati 
units is likely to fail. Because of the difficulties involved, it seems 
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judiclous to proceed sequentially on a step —by-step basis, rather than by 
rushing- into a one-time Imposition a£ some -ideal system. 
The approach suggested here is to begin; with a very crude criterion 
axid make a. series of adjustments which lead to successively better measures 
of the contribution of the enterprise to national welfare. Each phase 
represents, an. unambiguous improvement in its own right. As experience is 
gained, at each phase, as information to support the system is made available, and. 
as training and review sessions make the strengths and weaknesses of each 
phase apparent to all participants",—then the stage will be set for movement 
to the next higher' and more sophisticated phase. Failure to proceed 
sequentially might over-tax: the absorbtive capacity of the implement or s 
and- cause the whole effort to collapse. 
Suggested phases, in terms of the operative criterion are as follows: 
Phase I: Private profit is the crude existing starting point. 
Phase IX: Adjustments are made to reflect the differences 
between public and private benefits and costs 
(e.g., taxes are. a private cost but a public 
transfer, as are interest—arbitrage earnings) yielding 
public profit at current market prices. 
Phase III: Adjustments, are made for two major factors generally 
beyond managers' control — prices and the quantity 
of capital he has to work with — yielding public 
profitability at constant market prices. 
Phase IV-A: Adjustments, are made for other factors beyond management 
control (e.g., operation in a backward region, a 
depressed industry, or using outmoded equipment) by 
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ea tab lis hing different negotiated criterion values 
(targets) for different enterprises. That is, while 
public profitability at constant market prices is a 
good indication, of managerial performance for most 
enterprises, different levels (say 15 percent for one 
enterprise in favorable, circumstances, versus only 
five percent for one in a less favorable environment) 
might be taken to represent identical levels of managerial 
achievement^__Iiitroduction of a disclosure bonus system 
can aid in identifying reasonable targets. 
Phase IV-B: Dynamic effects are incorporated by identifying 
relevant variables, establishing an evaluation 
scale, and assigning appropriate weights. 
Phase IV-C: Adjustment can be made for non-commercial objectives 
by introducing a social adjustment account. This allows 
the costs of meeting non-consiercial objectives to be 
entered as transfers of surplus (below the public profit 
line) rather than costs (above the public profit line). 
Negotiation between the Ministry, the Corporations, 
and the enterprises are required to identify just which 
costs are legitimately treated in this fashion. The 
negotiation, process focuses attention on the subsidies 
implicit in such activities and admits legitimate 
expenditures, while allowing the government to hold 
the. manager- responsible for all remaining costs 
incurred in meeting commercial objectives. 
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Phasa V: Adjustments are made to all accounts to reflect real 
social values. As already noted, this is unlikely 
to serve as a practical external control device, but 
could have major internal research and analysis utility. 
The time needed tr Implement each phase will vary. Movement to 
Phase II would take no time at all. The ministry need only announce 
that henceforth "profit" will be measured at a somewhat diffèrent point 
on the profit and loss statement, to better reflect the enterprise's 
contribution to society. A seminar or two will be needed to explain 
why the new measure is an improvement. Movement to Phase III will take 
substantially more time, the constraint being the development of an 
information system to allow the necessary measurements. 
Movement to Phase IV requires no new information -processing 
capability and can proceed, as quickly as the negotiating environment permits. 
The forum for. these negotiations would probably be the regular "review 
meetings" already conducted by the Ministry. Pressures for adjustments 
for environmental and non-commercial factors would presumably emerge in 
earlier1 stages. Initially, these factors could be allowed for in a 
subjective and informal, way, and movement to Stage TV merely 
unifies and formalizes the adjustment procedures. 
Phase VI requires more sophisticated analytic talents at the Ministry 
and. has less direct relevance for control purposes. Its irperaMnnal 
_. implementation might be delayed. 
XIV 7 Illustration of Performance Evaluation Methodology 
Is the performance evaluation methodology suggested above 
feasible in the Pakistani context? Is it useful? This section 
addresses these two questions for static operational efficiency by 
actually applying the method to a single public enterprise 
over the last five years.— Pak American is chosen simply 
becasse earlier work on this company (in 1976) meant that only updating 
was necessary» It should be stressed that this effort is meant only 
to be illustrative, as some of the price adjustments have been mad® 
with less than complete information. For example, actual prices 
received, for the primary output have been used, but a general chemical 
products index was used for secondary products. Similarly, on the 
input side, the actual price of natural .gas was used, but a number of 
other intermediates were grouped together as "imported" or "domestic" 
and general deflators used. A number of similar cases exist in which 
short-cuts were taken because the calculation was made in the United States. 
sad which would not have been, necessary had the #<?rk been done in 
Islamabad. Th-a. results, then, while broadly accurate, require further 
refinement, and are presented here only as illustrative, rather than 
as a final commentary on Pak .American. Also, in the interest of space, 
only the outputs of the process are presented here. Details of the 
11/ calculations can be found elsewhere.— 
r̂-
Section I of Table Two give the various measures of surplus,( and 
the results suggest some of the limitations of the traditional measures. 
First, private profit is substantially higher than public profit and 
increases dramatically from 78/79 to 79/80, while public profit declines. 
10/ The calculations have been done for the entire period since 1968. 
However, the change from coal to natural gas as feedstock created 
a discontinuity in 1973 and make It necessary to obtain a few pieces 
of: information before these results can be reported. Also, some 
price data are missing for 79/80 and must be obtained before the 
constant price series can be completed for that year. 
11/ Jones, Performance Evaluation. 
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Table Twò • 
SELECTED PERFORMANCE INDICATORS ! 
BAS. AMERICAN FERTILIZER EH THE 1970s 
" I» Flows (million rupees) 
75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 
• A. 2/ Private Profit-' 1.4 -4.1 7.9 5.6 38.8 
B. Public. Profit—^ (§ 
current market prices 6.1 -9.7 -7.3 -16.1 -34Ì 4 
C. Public Profit @ — 
constant market prices 15.2 12.3 16.3 16.9 
D. Public Profit @ 
current shadow prices 37.6 15.1 32.9 25.5 
E. Public Profit @ 
. constant shadow prices 48.6 44.1 • 47.1 47.2 
II. Stocks (million rupees) -
-
A. Fixed Assets @ 
accountants' prices 67.5 61.0 55.3 47.2 38.4 
B.. Fixed Assets @ 
constant market prices 440 441 . 441 442 
C» Fixed Assets <§ _ . 
rolling market prices- 477 520 559 570 
I H . 
(percent) 
Ratios:; Profit over Fixed Assets 
A. Private Accounting 2..1 -6.7 14.2 11.9 
- B. Public: current market 1.3 -1.8 -1.3 -2.8 
C. Public: constane market 3.5 2.8 3.7 3.8 
IV. Capacity Utilisation (percent) 102 105 100 103 104 
1/ Data, for- 72/73 are not available. 
2/ After—tax profit as per profit and loss statement 
3/ Public profit is strictly defpined as a quasi-rent. 
4/ All constant: price series use 73/74 as the base year. 
5/ "Rolling price" series are stock aggregations in constant prices of 
- ' f n 1 — — » 7 ? o f n . . 
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The reason for this may be seen by looking at the reconciliation of 
public and private profit in Table Three. Public profit differs from-
private profit, in three wayst first, it includes other distributions 
of the surplus (depreciation, taxes and interest); second, it excludes 
various non—operational sources of income (interest earnings, subsidies, 
j 
net non-operational income); and third, it deducts the opportunity cost 
of working capital. Any of these factors can create a divergence 
between public and private profit, but the major difference in this 
case is in the subsidy paid to the firm. This rose from Ss. 40-million 
to Rs. 150 million, but half of this was taken back in increased taxes. 
The result is that public profit declined substantially while private 
profit increased. Now there is nothing wrong —- and much to be said 
in favor of — an explicit government subsidy as a means of financing 
am enterprise, whose output is underpriced as a result of government 
policy. However, it is essential that, changes in this policy should not 
be interpreted as Indicating better — or worse — enterprise performance. 
Private profit went up largely because of the rise in the subsidy, not 
because of greater efficiency. 
Second, note that public profit at market prices has deteriorated 
while public profit at constant prices has risen. This shows that 
the prices of inputs have risen more, than the prices of outputs- This 
means that the decline in the surplus is due to the enterprise not 
passing on all the price increases,, but instead absorbing some of the 
increase: in lower surplus. In constant market prices, efficiency has 
actually increased between 75/76 and 78/79. 
Third, the-surplus at shadow prices is substantially greater 
than at market prices. This is largely the result of two offsetting 
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Table Three 
PUBLIC VERSUS PRIVATE PROFIT 
PAK AMERICAN 
73/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 79/80 
Private Profit " 1.4 -4.1 7.9 5.6 38.8 





Less Non-Operational Sources of Surplus 
1 I Subsidies 
X 
Interest Earned and. Misc. 
Less Op. Cost of Working Capital, 
Equals Public Profit 
6.9 • 7.2 6.5 10.5 10.7 
6.2 1.9 5.6 9.3 78.0 
1.0 0.9 0.5 0.5 0.2 
0.0 5.6 17.6 39.9 150.4 
2.2 2.1 2.3' -5.5 3.8 
7.1 7.8 7.8 7.4 8.0 
6.1 -9.7 -7.3 -16.1 -34.4 
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dlstortiions.. The market price of fertilizer is one-third of the 
shadow price, but most of. the resulting rise in surplus is offset 
because the market price of the major input (natural gas) is one-sixth 
the shadow price« 
Fourth, the trend at constant market prices is quite similar to 
the trend at constant shadow prices, as was predicted earlier. 
There is, however, one major difference. In constant market prices 
the surplus is greater in 78/79 than In 75/76 whereas in constant 
shadow prices it is lower. The reason for this can be seen from 
Table Four which breaks down the components of public profit. The 
difference is that intermediate inputs have risen at constant shadow 
prices while remaining almost unchanged at constant market prices. This 
in turn is because the biggest increase in quantity over the period has 
been in natural gas. Because, it is underpriced, natural gas is only 
one third of total intermediate-input costs in market prices whereas-
it is two-thirds of total intermediate input costs at shadow prices. 
Accordingly the weight: of the natural gas quantity change is twice as 
high at shadow prices and the. increase at constant costs is greater. 
Fifth, in this case, moving to profitability by dividing through 
by the quantity of capital adds nothing to the story because the 
quantity of capital is essentially unchanged over the period. In 
comparing, across firms, of course,.' this adjustment would be critical. 
The only point worth noting is the egregiously misleading picture of 
asset stocks given by the accountants' measure. Because of exaggerated 
depreciation and failure to account for price changes, the accounting 
figure shows a continual decline In the quantity of capital, whereas 
in fact the manager has essentially the same stock of fixed capital to 
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Tahla Four 
DECOMPOSITION OF PUBLIC PROFIT 
75/76 76/77 77/78 78/79 
I. At Constant Market Prices 
Output 56.3 58.0 56.6 56.4 
- Int ermediat e—Inputs 28.3 32.9 28.6 28.1 
- Wages (and Rent) 7.5 7.5 7.1 7.0 
- Op. Cost of Working Capital 5.4 5.2 4.5 4.4 
SS Public Profit 15.2 12.3 16.3 16.9 
At Constant Shadow Prices • 
Output 164.8 167.9 161.7 166.4 
- Intermediate Inputs 101.9 109.7 102.0 10/.8 
- Wages (and Rent) 6.2 6.2 5.9 5.8 
- Op,Cost of Working Capital •8.0 7.8 6.8 6.6 
a Public Profit 48.6 44.1 47.1 47. i 
Z, 
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work with over the entire period. This is of course not a criticism 
of the Pak American accountants s who are simply following the standard 
conventions. 
Sixth, the figures illustrate the dangers of drawing conclusions 
from partial proxy indicators of performance. Capacity utilization is 
the highest in 1976/77'(Table Two,. Line IV) whereas all the measures 
of surplus are lowest in that year. There are two reasons for this. 
First, capacity utilization only measures the output of the major 
product whereas the output of subsidiary products declined In 76/77, 
offsetting some of the primary increase. Much more importantly, in. 
76/77 the quantities of inputs consumed rose even more than the quantity 
of output, meaning that the firm's net contribution to the economy was 
lower, even though capacity utilization was higher. 
These numbers do not tell the final story for Pak American. In 
part this is because some of the price indices need refinement. More 
importantly, account must be taken of special circumstances. Was there 
an unexpected shut-off of natural gas or electricity? Was there labor 
unrest due to external political factors? These are the kinds of 
questions that would have to be raised in a review meeting. The point 
is not that these indicators provide a final answer to the performance 
evaluation question. The point is only that if senior officials entered 
the review meeting armed with a page of such indicators, they would be 
far better equipped to judge managerial performance and to find ways 
of: improving the enterprise's contribution to society. 

